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SELECTING THE JURY.-
The right of challenge to a jury is as old as the jury system
itself. It was in use among the Romans in criminal cases from
very ancient times. The Lex Servilla, in the second century before
the Christian era, enacting that the accuser and the accused should
each name one hundred judices, from which each might reject
fifty, so that one hundred remained to try the case. Blackstone
shows the great similarity of our jury customs, as to their being
summoned, impanelled, challenged and sworn, to the practice in
the Roman republic, before she lost her liberty. Quoting from
Tully and other early writers, and in comparing them with usages
of the common law, he says, "Indeed these selecd'judices bore in
many respects a remarkable resemblance to our juries: -for they
were first returned by the prxtor; de decuria Senatoria conscribun-
ter: Then their names were drawn by lot, till a' certain number
was completed: in urnam sortio mittunter, ut de pluribus necessarius
numerus conficiposset: Then the parties were allowed their chal-
lenges; post urnam permittitur accusatori, ac reo, ut ex illo numero
rejiciant quos putaverint sibi, aut inimicos, aut ex aliqua re incommodus
fore: Next-they struck what we call a tales; rejection- celebrata, in
eorum locum qui rejecti fuerunt subsortiebatur prator alios, quibus ille
judicum legitimus numerus comleretur: Lastly, the judges, like our
jury, were sworn; his perfectis, jurabant in leges judices, ut obstricti
religionejudicarent.l1
In England the right of challenge has existed from the earliest
period. In Granville's time the tenant was permitted to object,
for good cause, to any of the recognitions of the assize, and Brac-
ton tells us2 that a person put upon his trial, if he had just cause
to suspect any of the jurors to be influenced by improper feelings
toward him, might object to their being on the inquest and cause
them to be removed. And so far was this rule adopted that, cor-
responding with the resuscatiojudicis of Justinian's code, it was the
ancient law of England, that, for good cause, the judge himself
might be removed.3 In line with the words of Fortescue, of more
than five hundred years ago: "The jurors selected to try a cause
1 Sharswood's Blackstone's Commentaries, Bk. III. 366.
2 Bracton III. C. 22.
8 Ib., V. c. 15. Fleta, VI. c. 37.
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should not be strangers nor people of uncertain character, whose
circumstances are unknown." It was once the law of England
that it was ground for challenge to the array that the jurors were
not returned from the hundred in which the venue was laid, and
therefore, where the cause of action was supposed to have arisen.
The object of this article is to review the qualifications of
jurors and the grounds of challenge, rather than a discussion of
the manner of selecting the panel and the practice in summoning
and returning juries, so variously regulated by the statutes of the
States; but some general remarks upon those subjects are not
inappropriate, by way of introduction to the questions it is pro-
posed to consider, as being of greater interest to the profession.
At common law, in a civil case after issue joined, the court
awarded a writ of venire facias upon the record, commanding the
sheriff to summon to appear on a certain day, "twelve free and
lawful men, liberales et legales homines, of the body of the county,"
not of kin to the parties, to try that particular cause. If the
sheriff was not an indifferent person, the venire issued to the cor-
oner, and, failing his qualifications, to two clerks of the court,
or to two persons named by the court, called elisors, duly sworn
for that purpose.4 By the statute of 3 Geo. II. c. 25, a jury of
twelve for each case is no longer returned, but one panel, con-
taining not less than forty-eight nor more than seventy-two jurors,
is summoned for every cause to be tried at the same assizes; and
their names being written on tickets, are put into a box or glass,
and when each cause is called twelve of these persons, whose
names shall be first drawn out of the box, are sworn upon the
jury, unless absent, challenged or excused. In this country the
practice is entirely regulated by the statutes of the several States.
In some of them the lists of qualified persons for jury service is
made up by special boards; in others, by an officer of the court,
such as the sheriff, in conjunction with other county officers; and,
in the New England States, by the town authorities, to whom the
venire is issued for that purpose. In the Federal Courts, the
practice is regulated by the Act of Congress of June 3 oth, 1879,
requiring the juries to be drawn from a box containing the names
of three hundred persons, placed therein by the clerk of the court,
and a commissioner appointed by a judge; the clerk and the
commissioner being of opposite political parties.
4 Sharswood's Blackstone's Com., Book III. 352, 355. Assimilated to this
is the practice in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where, when a defective
verdict has been rendered, found upon error appearing on the record, the
judgment is reversed and a venire facias de jovo is awarded.
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The qualifications of a juror are regulated by statute; in some
of the States those qualifications are prescribed by their Constitu-
tions, in others they are directed by legislative enactments. There
are three requisites, now almost universally prescribed: (a) Thejuror must be a citizen of the county. At common law, a jury de
medietate lingue, consisting half of aliens and half of inhabitants,
was a privilege accorded where either party was an alien born.This has now been abolished in England and in all of the States
except Kentucky, where such a jury may still be returned if sodirected by the court. 5 (b) The juror must be a male and above
the age of twenty-one years. While at common law, a jury of
women may be empanelled in certain cases upon a writ de venireinspidendo, a privilege which, no doubt, still remains, but the
writer is not aware of any statute permitting females to sit asjurors in an ordinary civil cause, or criminal trial; although it
may be granted them in those States, e. g., Wyoming and Colorado,
where the right of suffrage has been extended to women. (c)Generally, it is requisite that a juror shall possess the electivefranchise and be entitled to vote in the county wherein the causeis to be tried. A diligent search has failed to discover any case
where the contrary has been held; it may, therefore, be assumed,in the absence of a statute to the contrary, that every juror must
be an elector.6
At common law the qualifications of a juror, in addition to
residence and citizenship, as named by Coke, under the head ofiropter defectum, required that he should be a freeman and pos-
sessed of an estate of a certain value. This property qualifica-
tion has been the subject of legislative enactment in the United
States, having been abolished in some and expressly required in
others.7
5 In England, Act 3 Viet. ch. 14; In Kentucky, G. L. 1879, p. 571.6 In Arkansas it is held that a resident in the county, and a citizen of theState, is competent to serve as a juror, although his residence has not been ofsufficient length to confer upon him political privileges. Anderson v. State, 5Ark. 444- See also State v. Francis, 76 Mo. 681. In United States v. Nar-dello, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 503, it was held that a juror was qualified as a resident
of Washington to sit in the trial of 'a case in the District of Columbia, becausehe lived in that city, although he spent his vacations and voted in Virginia.Quere, Would he be a qualified juror in that State? It was held in Nevadathat a qualified voter who had not paid his poll tax or had been regis-tered, although the time had not expired within which to perfect his registry,
was noc rendered incompetent to sit as a juror. State v. Salge, z Nev. 455.7 New York, Virginia, North Carolina and New Mexico require the jurorto be possessed of property. In Texas, Mississippi and Alabama, he must be
a householder. In Indiana he must be both a freeholder and a householder.
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Certain persons are generally exempt from jury service; those
exemptions relating to age, occupation, previous service, and
mental or physical infirmity. Thus, jurors under twenty-one or
over sixty or seventy years of age are exempt. So also, by virtue
of their occupation, are attorneys-at-law, while in practice; clergy-
men; physicians; public officers and court officials; justices of
the peace and constables; professors and teachers in colleges and
schools, and their students and pupils; members of the militia and
of fire companies; railroad, steamboat and incorporated bank
officers and employees; and mail agents, public stage drivers and
telegraph officers.
But all thdse exemptions are a personal privilege which may
be waived by those to whom they apply, and do not operate as
such disqualifications which may be claimed by the parties to the
action as grounds of challenge.
Challenges are of two kinds: to the array, or panel, and to the
polls. At common law, the former was confined to the partiality
or some default in the sheriff who arrayed the panel; but, with
the enlargement of the processes of selecting, drawing and return-
ing the jury tests, the grounds for challenging the array have
been enlarged until it may be stated, as a general rule, that any
want of statutory form, properly presented, would be cause for
quashing the panel; many of the States having statutory enact-
ments as to the grounds for the challenge.
Challenges to the polls, the particular subject of this article,
are of two classes, peremptory, and for cause. At common law
it seems that the right to challenge peremptorily was not permit-
ted in civil cases, Blackstone making no mention of challenges in
those causes; but in criminal trials for felonies punishable with
death, the prisoner could exercise this right to the number of
thirty-five; that is, one under the number of three full juries,
reducea, by the statute of 22 Henry VIII. c. 14, to twenty.
Blackstone says that this is "a provision full of that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly
famous;" and adds that it is grounded on two reasons: " i. As
every one must be sensible what sudden impressions and unac-
countable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks
and gestures of another, and how necessary it is that a prisoner
(when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his
jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him, the law
wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom
he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to dssign a
reason for such his dislike. 2. Because, upon challengeg for
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cause shown, if the reasons assigned prove insufficient to set
aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may
sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences
from which the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremp-
torily to set him aside." s
Prior to the statute of 33 Edw. I., ch. 4, the Crown could exer-
cise the right of peremptory challenge to an unlimited extent
without alleging any other reason than quod non boni sunt prorege.
This statute, while it took away that unlimited right, was con-
strued by the courts to allow the prosecution a qualified right of
peremptory challenge, which was exercised by allowing the crown
the privilege of setting aside jurors when called, without assign-
ing cause, until the panel was exhausted, when, if the full num-
ber was obtained, such jurors were not called, but if not, their
names were afterwards called on the general list. 9 Such is still
the practice in the Federal Courts, and in such of the States as
have not in this respect superseded the common law by statutes.' 0
In Brandreth's case the question arose whether the prisoner
should be required to exercise the right of peremptory challenge
before the right of challenge was exercised by the Crown, and,
after full argument, it was decided that, according to the uniform
practice, the right must first be exercised by the prisoner.1
While in England peremptory challenges are still forbidden,
except in cases of felony and treason,' 2 it can be stated that in
most of our jurisdictions, if not in all, this privilege is now
accorded in all criminal trials, as well as in civil causes, the num-
ber of challenges being regulated by statutes of the several States.
Under the revised statutes, section 819, in treason and capital
offences, the defendant is entitled to twenty, the United States to
five peremptory challenges; in other felonies the prisoner has ten,
the government thiee; in all other cases, civil or criminal, each
party has. three. In the State courts the number of such
-challenges approximate to the practice in the Federal Courts in
8 Sharswood's Black. Com., IV. 353.
9 Mansel v. The Queen, 8 El. & Bl. 54, 70.
1OM. S. v,. Shackelford, i8 How. 588; Com. v. Joliffe, 7 Watts (Pa.) 585:
Jewell V. Com., 22 Pa. St. Rep. 94; Wormeley v. Com., io Gratt. (Va.) 658;
State v. Stalmaker, 2 Brev. (S. C.) z; State v. Arthur, 2 Dev. L. (N. C.) 217;
State v. Craton, 6 Iredell (N. C.) 164.
1132 State Trials, 77r. To the same point are State v,. Bone, 7 Jones
(N. C.) 121; Jones v. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 475; State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 287
12 Creed v,. Fisher, 9 Exch. Rep. 472.
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criminal trials, and range from two to one-fifth of the jurors sum-
moned in civil cases.18 The right of each defendant in criminal
trials, where two or more are indicted and tried together, to the
full number of peremptory challenges, in the absence of a statu-
tory provision, has been variously adjudicated; but it seems to be
the better authority that where the statute gives such challenges
to "every person," it can be exercised by every defendant; but
where the right is extended to "each party," or to "either party,"
that only the full number can be allowed to all the defendants.14
In civil cases it seems to be settled that when there are several
defendants, making a common and joint defense, they have col-
lectively only the same number of peremptory challenges to which
one defendant would be entitled. 15 But where the defendants
plead separately, are represented by different counsel, and differ-
ent verdicts may be rendered against the several defendants, each
one is entitled to the statutory number of such challenges; 16 so,
also where several actions by the same plaintiff have been com-
menced, and afterwards consolidated under a common defense,
each defendant is entitled to the full number of challenges.'7
The ancient division of challenges for cause into principal
challenges, and those to the favor, no longer exists. The distinc-
tion lay in the mode of trying such challenges; .the former being
decided by the courts, and the latter by triors; but now they are
universally tried by the court, triors having been abolished by
statute.18
The various grounds of challenge for cause apply equally in
civil and criminal cases. As we have seen, it is of right and co-
13 These statutes are collated in 12 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 347. Title,
"Jury and Jury Trial."
14Thompson & Merriam on Juries, Sec. 162; United States v. Hall, 44
Fed. Rep. 883; Moschell v. State, 22 AU. Rep. 5o; State v. Stoughton, 51 Vt.
362. Contra, See Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; Wiggins v. State, i Lea
(Tenn.) 738.
15 Stone v. Segur, 93 Mass. 568; Snodgrass v. Hunt, i5 Md. 274; Bibb v.
Reid, 3 Ala. 88; Schmidt v. Chicago & R. R. Co., 83 Ill. 405.
10 Strote v. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490.
17 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, i45 U. S. 285.
18 "The triors, in case the first man called be challenged, are two indiffer-
ent persons named by the court; and if they try one man and find him indif-
ferent, he shall be sworn; and then he and the two triors shall try the next;
and when another is found indifferent and sworn, the two triors shall be super-
seded, and the two first sworn on the jury shall try the rest." Sharswood's
Blackstone's Com. III. 363.
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existent with the jury system itself. The constitutional right of
trial by jury implies that the trial shall be by an impartial jury,
and upon that question the courts have spoken in no uncertain
language. In Diven v. City of Elmira, 5i N. Y. 5o6, it was said:
"The object of the law is to procure impartial, unbiased persons
for jurors. They must be omni excejtione majores." The Supreme
Court of Georgia, in Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682, said: "An
impartial jury is the corner-stone of the fairness of trial by jury;"
and in Ensign v. Harvey, 15 Neb. 330, it was well said: "Unless
fair-minded, and unbiased jurors can be selected, a trial becomes
a mere farce, dependent, not upon the merits of the case, but upon
extraneous circumstances, such as the bias, prejudice, or interest of
the jury." Doctor Warren, in advising the young practitioner,
sums up the matter thus: "Look sharply after your jury panel,
otherwise you may have, as one of your judges, one whom no evi-
dence, no arguments, would persuade to give your client a verdict;
one who may be his personal enemy, or the friend, or relation of
your opponent; or may belong to some trade, profession or calling,
which would be injuriously affected by your success; or enjoy
rights in respect of property situated similarly with that which you
seek to affect with liability." 19
The grounds of challenge for cause include the following:
I. Lack of statutory qualifications. These we have discussed
supra, but to them it can be added that a juror who does not under-
stand the Etiiglish language is disqualified from sitting in the case,
although his rejection on that ground is largely within the discre-
tion of the court.20
II. Interest in the result of the action disqualifies, but not an
interest merely in the legal questions involved without an interest
in the result of the cause.2 1 The various grounds of interest are
19 Warren's "Duties of Attorneys," 192.
20 Sutton v. Fox, 55 Wis. 53i; Fisher 7v. Philadeiphia, 4 Brewster (Pa.) 395;
McCampbell v. State, 9 Tex. App. X24; Lyle v. State, 41 Tex. 172; Plankroad
Co. v'. Railroad Co., 13 Ind. 99. The writer had the novel experience of trying
a case for a week where, after verdict, it was discovered that three of the jurors,
although born in the county, did not understand a word of English, and had
been ignorant of all that had transpired at the trial. It had been held in the
same court that this was not ground for a new trial. The losing side had the
satisfaction of learning that these jurors had voted for them until the last bal-
lot; possibly a reason to satisfy the defendants that the verdict was not im-
proper.
21 Wood v. Stoddard, 2 Johns (N. Y.) 194; Williams v. Smith, 6 Com. (N.
Y.) x66.
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these: (a) Pecuniary in the result of the suit.22 But not for mere
liability for attorney's fees, without interest in the cause.23 (b)
Similar case pending.2 4  In Davis v. Allen, i' Pick. 466, it
appeared that a juror had an interest and claim, the success of
which would depend upon the same state of facts controverted at
the trial, and it was held that it would have constituted a good
ground for challenge, had the exception been seasonably taken.
(c) That the juror has wagered upon the result of the suit.26
(d) Citizenship and taxpayer in a town or city party to the
action. In many of the States, statutes expressly remove this dis-
qualification; but, in the absence of such a statute, it seems to be
settled that the juror is not competent if the action, is against a
municipality for damages, or for the direct recovery of money on
any other ground, so that the judgment might result in the imposi-
tion of an additional tax on him or his property.26  And the tax-
payer is equally disqualified whether the result of the trial may be
to increase or diminish his taxes.27 But not upon the trial of one
accused of violating a city ordinance; or for murdering a police-
-man, although the city has employed counsel to aid the prosecu-
tion; or for stealing property of the county; or for burning the
county jail.28 (e) Membership in a private corporation party to the
action. Universally, this disqualifies the juror, be his interest in
the corporation great or small, provided the corporation is directly
-interested in the result of the trial.2 9  But the juror is not neces-
sarily disqualified, from the fact that he is a member of a corpora-
22 Small v. Jones, 6 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 122; Meeker v. Potter, 5 N. 5. Law,
586; Omaha v. Kane, 15 Neb. 657.23 Doyal v. State, 7o Ga. i34;'B. & 0. R.R. Co. v. P. W. & B. R.R. Co.,
17 W. Va. 812.
24 Gardner v. Lanning, 3 N. J. Law, 231; Lord v,. Brown, 5 Denio (N. Y.
.345; Talmadge v. Northrup, i Root (Conn.) 455.
25 Essex v. McPherson, 64 Ill. 349; Cheverius v. Com., 8i Va. 787; Seaton.
v,. Swem, 58 Iowa 41.
26 Diven v. City Elmira, 5i N. Y. 506; Goshen v. England, I19 Ind. 368;
Gibson v. Wyandotte, 20 Kan. 156; Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 5S; Fulwei-
ier 7,. St. Louis, 6 Mo. 479; Kendall ,. City Albia, 73 Iowa 243; Mayor Colum-
bus v. Goetchius, 7 Ga. 139.
27 11awes v. Gustin, 2 Allen (Mass.) 404; Wood z. Stoddard, 2 Johns (N)
Y.) 194; State v,. Williams, 30 Me. 484.
28 Middletown v. Ames, 7 Vt. i66; State v. Wells, 46 Iowa 662; Doyal v.
State, 7o Ga. 134; People v. Bennett, 37 N. Y. 177; Phillips v. State, 29 Ga.
105.
29 Respublica v. Richards, i Yeates, 480; Peninsula R. R. Co. v. Howard,
go Mich. i8; Page v. Contoocook Valley R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 438; Fleeson v.
Savage Mining Co., 3 Nev. i57.
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tion of which one of the parties is also a member; or is a membei'
of a similar corporation; unless, indeed, a prejudice can be shown
arising from that connection.80 (f) Membership in an association
party to the action, where the juror must contribute to the expen-
ses of the suit.81 And so if the action relate to the property of a
church of which he is a member, he is incompetent; 8 but not sim-
ply because the action is against another church member, or'
against a church of the same denomination, but of which he is not
a member.8 In Miles v. United States, i3 Otto 304, Mr,
Justice Woods said: "It is evident from the examination of
the jurors on their voir dire, that they believed that polyg-
amy was ordained of God, and that the practice of polygamy
was obedience to the will of God. At common law, this would
have been ground for principal challenge of jurors of the
same faith." But from what follows, it is clear that the
court put the incompetency on the ground of actual bias, rather
than on religious belief. " It needs no argument to show that a
jury composed of men entertaining such a belief could not have
been free from bias or prejudice, on the trial for bigamy, of a per-
son who entertained the same belief, and whose offense consisted
in the act of living in polygamy. * * * Whether or not that
bias was founded on the religious belief of the juror, is entirely
immaterial, if the bias existed." It has been held, with little
variation, that the fact that a juror is a member of the same
benevolent or social organization, or of the same secret society,
with one of the parties to the action, does not render him incom-
petent, in the absence of special prejudice proven against him,
The question was'discussed at length, and with much ability,
in the leading case of Purple v. Horton, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 9,
where it was held that it is no cause of challenge to a juror that
he is a freemason, where one of the parties to the suit is a
member of that-society, and the other is not; and that the
oath taken by a master mason, or a royal arch mason, on his
admission to the society, does not disqualify him in such an action.
There is not entire unanimity of opinion on the question as to
whether a juror is disqualified by reason of his membership in an
association formed to suppress a particular kind of crime, upon the
30 Miller v. Wild Cat Gravel R. R. Co., 52 Ind. 5i; Williams v. Smith, 6
Cow. (N. Y.) i66; Brittain v. Allen, 2 Dev. L. (N. C.) i2o.
31 Com. v. M'oore, 143 Mass. 136.
32 Cleague v. Hyden, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 73.
33 Barton v. Erickson, 14 Neb. x64.
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prosecution of a person accused of a crime of that class; but the
weight of authority is in favor of his competency; 84 unless the
objects of the association, or the circumstances disclosed, indicate
a hostility to the person on trial as an individual, or to all persons
of his class. 85
III. Relationship to the parties to the action. At common law,
this was cause of principal challenge, which may be to the blood or
kindred of either party within the ninth degree; and so it has been
held in some of the States.38 By statutes of other States, persons
are permitted to act as jurors, though more closely related to the
parties than would have been permitted at the common law.37
Relationship by affinity disqualified the juror at common law,
and under the statutes of most of the States, is also cause for chal-
lenge. 8 The disqualification exists either from the relation of the
juror to the wife of a party, or from the relation of his wife to the
party; the test, in the latter case, being to ascertain if the juror's
wife, wete her sexual disqualification removed, could be competent
to try the cause, and, in the former, if the juror would be compe-
tent if his relative were a party to the action. 39 But relationship
by affinity terminates on the death of the person by whose mar-
riage it was created, unless the marriage has resulted in issue who
are still living.40 Relationship to a party beneficially inter-
34 United States v. Borger, 7 Fed. Rep. 193; Boyle v. People, 4 Colo. 176;
State v. Hoxie, i5 R. Is. I; Musick v, People, 40 Ill. 272.
85 Com. v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347.
3 Sharswood's Black. Corn. III. 363; Wireback v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Pa.
St. Rep. 552; Jacques v. Com., io Gratt. (Va.) 69o; Morrison v. McKinnon, 12
Fla. 552; State v. Perry, Busb. (N. Car.) 33o. And Coke says: "How far re-
mote soever he is of kindred, yet the challenge is good." Coke Litt. 157.
87 In Alabama, within the fifth degree; Code Ala. Sec. 4186. In New York,
Maine and Indiana, sixth degree; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. Sec. 1166; Hardy t.
Sproule, 32 Me. 31o; High v. Big Creek Assn., 44 Ind. 356. In Vermont, Cal-
ifornia and Nebraska, fourth degree; Churchill v. Churchill, 12 Vt. 66x; Cal.
Pen. Code, See. 1074; Cal. Civil Code, See. 6o2; Marion v. State, 29 Neb. 233.
89 O'Conner v. State, 9 Fla. 215; Jacques v. Com., io Gratt. (Va.) 69o;
Wireback v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Pa. St. Rep. 552; Dailey v. Gaines, i Dana
(Ky.) 529; Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 331.
39 Dearmond v. Dearmond, IO Ind. 191; Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day
(Conn.) 491; Woodbridge v. Raymond, Kirby (Conn.) 28o; Den v. Clark, x N.
J. L 446; Trallinger v. Webb, 3 Ind. 198; Dailey v. Gaines, Hardy v. Sproule,
sujra.
40 Cain v. Ingham, 7 Cow., (N. Y.) 478 and note; State v. Shaw, 3 Tred.
(N. C.) 532; Monnyon v. West, i Leonard, King's Bench, 88. Chase v. Jen-
aings, 38 Me. 44; Foot v. Morgan, z 1Ii (N. Y.) 654; Carman v. Newall, i
Denio (N. Y.) 25; Vannoy v. Gives, 23 N. J. L. 201; Bigelow v. Spragne, 140
Mass. 425; Dearmond v. Dearmond, Jacques v. Com. supra.
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ested also disqualifies; and so held where the juror is related to a
stockholder in a corporation plaintiff or defendant; or related to
a taxpayer of a plaintiff town; or to one who may be called upon
to pay the judgment recovered; or to one interested in the prin-
ciple involved in the cause; or to an administrator suing in his
representative capacity; or to an attorney or counsel in the case,
whose fees depend upon recovery, but not, otherwise, by reason
of his relation to counsel.
41
IV. Dependence on a party to an action disqualifies a juror;
the test ii1 this class of cases being whether the juror is subject to
the control of the party. The converse of the proposition, viz:
that the party is within the control of the juror, depends upon the
question of whether there is bias as matter of fact. The vari-
ous grounds of dependence disqualifying the juror have been held
to be: 4 (a) That he is an employee or servant of one of the parties.
(b) Or his partner in business. (c) Or his tenant; this was so at
common law, and has so been held in modern cases, but not uni-
formly.. (d) Or surety for a party on an obligation, as indicating
a strong bias; and, if relating to the claim in suit, on the additional
ground of interest in the litigation. (e) Or if he receives favors
from a party, and still expects them, in a business way. (f) Or
is a witness in the same case.
But the juror is not disqualified because he is a debtor of the
party, unless actual bias is shown; or is the client of an attorney
party to the suit; or has an office in the same room with one of the
counsel in the case; or was an intimate friend of the party, in the
41 In the order named for these causes; (a) Georgia R. R. Co. v. Hart, 6o
Ga. 55o; Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87; (b) Carew v. Howard, i Root (Conn.)
324; Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 581, 583 (dicta); Day v. Savage, Hobart,
King's Bench, 85; (c) Woodbridge v. Raymond, Kirby (Conn.) 280; (d) Hartford
Bank v. Hart, 3 Day (Conn.) 491; (e) Balsbaugh v. Fraser, r Pa. St. Rep. 95;
(f) Melson v. Deckson, 63 Ga. 682; (g) Funk v. Ely, 45 Pa. St. Rep. 444;
Pipher v. Lodge, I6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 214; Wood v. Wood, 52 N. H. 422;
State v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391.
42 In the order given: (a) Hubbard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7; Central R. R.
Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; Louisville R. R. Co. v. Mack, 64 Miss. 738; Hill
v. Cochran, 15 Colo. 270; Gunter v. Graniteville Co., i8 S. C. 263; State v.
Coella, 3 Wash. I99; Block v. State, ioo Ind. 357; (b) Stumm v. Hummel, 39
Iowa 478; (c) Hathaway v. Helmer, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 29; Harrisburg Bank v.
Foster, 8 Watts (Pa.) 304; Pipher v. Lodge, i6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) iio; contra,
Brown v. Wheeler, i8 Conn. ig;. Marsh v. Coppock, 9 Car. & P. 4So; (d) Bra-
zleton, v. State. 66 Ala. 96; Anderson v. State, 63 Ga. 675; Bradshaw v. Hub-
bard, i Gilm. (Va.) 390; Ferriday v. Selser, 4 How. (Miss.) 5o6; (e) Omaha R. R.
Co. v. Cook (Neb.), 55 N. W. Rep. 943; (1) Com. v. Joliffe, 7 Watts (Pa.) 585.
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absence of actual bias; or is the guest of an innkeeper, but pays
for his accommodations and is under no special obligations to his
landlord.4 8
V. Disqualification of juror because of personal hostility, or
actual bias. As has already beeAh'said, the right to unprejudiced
jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right of trial
by jury. If a constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial, it
necessarily includes the guaranty that the trial shall be had before
an impartial jury. According to the expressions in some cases,
the juror should stand indifferent between the parties; in others,
it is said that his mind should be as white paper. By reason of
the dissemination of public information through the press, where-
by knowledge of the facts in the more important causes is very
generally made known, it is practically impossible to obtain jurors,
worthy to sit in the trial of such cases, who are without some knowl-
edge of the facts, and so it is, in these modern days, that the rule
must be confined to the exclusion from the jury box of those
whose bias, or preconceived opinion, is sufficient to sway their
judgment, or influence their verdict, against the evidence in the
cause; or, as was said in Burr's trial, "Those strong and deep im-
pressions which close the mind against the testimony which may
be offered in opposition to them-which will combat that testimony,
and resist its force." While the courts have universally declared
that bias or prejudice exclude the juror, there is no authority de-
fining the degree of bias necessary to found a challenge upon
that ground;, although in People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 349, the Court
said: "Prejudice is a state of mind which, in the eye of the law,
has no degrees. If the juror is prejudiced in any manner, he is
not a fit or proper person to sit in this box." But that statement
has not been followed in any other case, and must even there be
regarded as a dictum. In a general way, the proper rule has been
well stated in an able note to Commonwealth v. Brown, 9 Am.
State Rep.. 746: "Whenever a juror shows upon his examination
that he himself fears that his deliberations cannot be impartial, or
where he expresses a state of feeling from which it appears that
his mind is in an improper condition, he will generally be excluded."
It is impossible, within the limits of this article, to dwell at any
further length upon this subject, but the reader is referred to the
remarks of the learned justices, both of Supreme Court of Illinois
and of the United States, in the famous Chicago anarchists cases:
43 Thompson v. D6uglass, 35 W. Va. 337; Regina v. Geach, 9 Car. & P.
499; State v. Taylor, 5 Ind. App. 29; Moore v. Cass, io Kan. 288; Cummings
v. Gann, 52 Pa. St. Rep. 484.,
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Spies v. People, 122 Ill. I (S. C. 3 Am. State Rep. 320, 466-471)
and in re Spies et al., 123 U. S. 13 i-for an able discussion of this
question.
Above, we have referred to the grounds for challenge based
upon the implied bias of the juror, by reason of his interest in the
result of the action, relationship to the parties, and of his depen-
dence upon them. It is proposed now to summarize some of the
leading authorities holding specific grounds for the exclusion of
the juror by reason of his actual bias and preconceived opinion.
(a) Personal hostility towards one of the parties, or against
some one beneficially interested in the action, even though it be
general and without special reference to the matter in contro-
versy, will render the juror incompetent; and the juror is equally
disqualified if he is shown to have a bias in favor of one of the
parties; but prejudice against a third party, or against one of the
attorneys in the case will not, as a rule, render the juror incom-
petent. 44 (b) Litigation pending between the juror and one of the
parties was cause for challenge at common law, and would still be
ground for exclusion, if it appeared that there was the absence of
that impartiality and freedom from prejudice requisite to qualify
the juror for service.45 (c) Prejudice or bias against the business
in which a party is engaged, or against his nationality or creed, will
disqualify the juror, unless it appear that he can lay aside his preju-
dice and render an impartial verdict, according to the law and the
evidence. 48  It was held in United States v. Eagan, 3o Fed. Rep.
6o8, in an indictment for fraudulent registration, that the fact that
a man was a member of a political party, and a strong partisan,
did not affect his qualifications as a juror. (d) Prejudice against
the class of cases or defenses which the juror is called to try, if it
44 Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9; Brittain v. Allen. 2 Dev. (S. C.)
120; Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290; Chess v. Chess, i Pen. & Watts
(Pa.) 32; Denver & R. R. Co. v. Driscoll, J2 Colo. 520; Township v. Kirston, 72
Mich. I; Mason v. State, 15 Tex. App, 534; Monaghan v. Ag'L Inst., 53 Mich.
238; Jones v. State, 55 Md. 350; Pike Co. v. Griffin, 15 Ga. 39; Omaha v'.
Kane, 15 Neb. 657; Hutchinson v. State, io Neb. 262; Strawn v. Cogswell,
28 Ill. 457; Catasaqua Mfg. Co. v. Hopkins, 141 Pa. St. Rep. 30.
45 Coke on Litt. 157; 1 Chitty Crim. Law 541; People v'. Bodine, 1 Denio
(N. Y.) 281, 305; Davis v. Allen, ii Pick. (Mass.) 466.
46 Business or occupation: Lawlor v. Linforth, 72 Cal. 205; Winnesheik
Ins. Co. v. Scheuller, 6o Ill. 472; United States v. Noelke, i Fed. Rep. 426;
Mferetzek v. Caldwell, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 407; Shields v. State, 95 Ind. 299;
Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69; State v. Nelson, 58 Iowa 208; Williams v.
State, 3 Ga. 453. Nationality: Balbo v. People, 8o N. Y. 484. Creed: People
v. Christy, 2 Abb. Pr. 256; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 349.
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amounts to actual bias, will exclude the juror; certainly so if he
appears to distrust his own ability to impartially try the case. But
it must appear that the prejudice of the juror will influence his
verdict, and, in a criminal case, if the bias is only such as a law
abiding citizen ought to have, it cannot exclude him. 47 (e) Preju-
dice against crime generally does not render the juror incompe-
tent, in the absence of personal bias against the prisoner.
48
(f) Conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or against
conviction on circumstantial evidence, disqualifies the juror, unless
he shows that he can act fairly and impartially, and render a ver-
dict irrespective of his scruples or convictions. 49 (g) That an
opinion formed or expressed by a juror concerning the merits of
the cause, or the guilt of the accused, will disqualify him has been
well settled, but there is much conflict in the authorities as to the
degree of fixity of opinion, touching the facts at issue, which will
render him incompetent. In a general way, the rules governing
the question may be thus stated:
i. If the opinion is based merely upon rumor or newspaper
statements, and the juror testifies that he can give an impartial
verdict from the evidence, he is generally admitted to the box.
2. But if the opinion has been formed through reports of the
testimony, or from conversation with witnesses, it is held that the
juror is disqualified.
3. The weight of authority-as well as statutes of many of the
States-is now to the effect that if the juror testifies to the satis-
faction of the court, that he believes his previously formed opinion
will have no effect, but will yield to the evidence, and that he can
render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence, he
will be allowed to serve.50
47People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238; Anson v. Dwight, i8 Iowa 241;
Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378; McCarthy v'. Cass Ave., 92 Mo. 536; Spies v.
People, 122 111. 1 (S. C. 123, U. S. 131); Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Scheuller, sufira;
People v. McGonegal, 136 N. Y. 62; Com. v. Poisson, 157 Mass. 5io.
48 Davis v. Hunter, 7 Ala. I35; State v. Burns, 85 MO. 47; Kroer v'. Peo-
ple, 78 Ill. 294; U. S. v. Borger, 7 Fed. Rep. 193; Williams v. State, 3 Ga.
453; Spies v. People, sujpra.
49 Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276;
People v. Fanshaw, 137 N. Y. 68; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; State v.
Ward, 39 Vt. 225; Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389; State v. Shields, 33 La.
Ann. 991. For a collecti6n of the cases and a full discussion of the authorities
see 3 Wharton Crim. Law, Sec. 31Y6-3121.
50 See Statutes and authorities collated in 12 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law,
354, 355, and notes; 3 Wharton Criminal Law, Sec. 3o64-310; 2 Effiott's Gen-
eral Practice, Sec. 524 and notes.
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But an opinion upon collateral, or merely incidental questions
involved, does not disqualify, unless shown to be such as likely to
influence the verdict ; 51 although an opinion that the defendant
has already been sufficiently punished in a criminal prosecution
will disqualify the juror on a civil action to recover damages for
the same wrong.5
VI. Prior service of the juror, as such, upon a former trial of
the same case is cause for challenge; 53 or if he has served as a
juror upon the trial of a co-defendant; 54 or was one of the grand
jury who found the indictment against the prisoner.5 5 But, in
the absence of a statute, it is not a ground for challenge that the
juror on a prior case had found a verdict against the prisoner for
another offense, or had been a juror in a civil case involving the
same general questions.58
As has already been said, all challenges for cause are now
tried by the court; the ancient practice of submitting the deter-
.innation of challenges to the favor to triors having become obso-
lete, or been abolished by statute; and in many cases the trial
court is entitled to a wide discretion, particularly in the control of
the challenges, the manner of examination of the juror, and in
excusing jurors.57 Generally, the decision of the court, particu-
larly in challenges to the favor, like the findings of the triors, is
conclusive as to the facts.58
51 Weston v. Com., iii Pa. St. Rep. 251; Hughes v. Cairo, 92 Ill. 339;
Patterson v. State, 48 N. J. L. 381; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336; Elbin
v. Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Dew v. McDevitt, 31 Ohio St., 139.
52 Asbury Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, 66 Me. 523.
53 Dunn v. State, 7 Tex. App. 6oo; Jacobs v. State, 9 Ib. 278; State v,.
Sheeley, 15 Iowa; Argent v. Darrell, 2 Salk. K. B. 648.
54 Morton v. State, I Kan. 468; Arnold v. State, 9 Tex. App. 435; 1 Inst. 157.
55 Greenwood v. State, 34 Tex. 334; Rex v. Cook, 13 St. Tr. 334; Rice v.
State, 16 Ind. 298; State v. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456; Bearson v. State, 34
Miss. 602; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa 287; Stewart v. State, i5 Ohio St 155.
58 U. S. v. Schackelford, 3 Cranch. C. C. 178; Com. v. Hill, 4 Allen (Mass.)
59r; Plow Co. v. Deutsch, I6 Neb. 384; Patterson v. State, 48 N. J. L. 381.
57 State v. Linde, 54 Iowa 139; Rowell v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 58
N. H. 514; Thompson on Trials, Sec. 88; 3 Wharton Crim. Law, Secs. 3140-
.3i5r; 12 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law 359-36r.
58 Stout v. People, 4 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 132; People v. Bodine, i Denio (N.
Y.) 281, 309: U. S. v. McHenry, 6 Blatchf. 5o3; Patterson v. State, 48 N. 3. L.
381; State v. Ihrig, xo6 -Mo. 267; State v. Green, 95 N. Car. 6rz; Pickens v.
Hobb, 42 Ind. 270; Lockhart v. State, 92 Ind. 452.
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To determine the competency of the juror he is examined
upon his voir dire. Much latitude is permitted in this examina-
tion, leading questions being permitted, within the discretion of
the court, and, in some cases, hypothetical questions have been
permitted to ascertain how the juror would decide under a sup-
posed state of the evidence. But the later decisions deny this
right, particularly the recent case of Chicago & R. R. Co. v.
Fisher, 14i Ill. 614. The questions asked the juror, however,
should be pertinent, fair and honest, and not such as tend to dis-
grace or degrade him.59 While the usual mode of determining
the competency of the juror is by his examination, yet other evi-
dence may be given to prove the ground of challenge. 60
In Regina v. Frost, 9 Cart. P. 92, Lord Tindal said: "The
rule is that challenges must be made as the jurors come to the
book, and before they are sworn. The moment the oath is begun
it is too late, and the oath is begun by the juror taking the book,
having been directed by the officer to do so." Now, however, it
is universally held that the challenges can be made at any time
before the jury is sworn, and, in some courts, after the oath has
been administered, but before anything else is done; and in some
cases both the peremptory challenge and those for cause have
been subsequently permitted, but that request is addressed only
to the discretion of the Court.
Where, after the exercise of due diligence, an incompetent
juror has been admitted, the party has a right to complain, as
soon as he discovers the disqualification, which may be before or
after verdict: in the former case a juror should be withdrawn and
the case continued; in the latter, it is ground for a new trial;
both somewhat within the discretion of the court.61
Objections to jurors have been held to be waived in the fol-
lowing cases: (a) When the juror is accepted without examina-
tion as to his qualifications it is a waiver of all objections that
might have been thereby discovered, unless the disqualification
were unknown to the party and his counsel at the time of trial; this
exception, however, is not universally recognized.62  (b) Knowl-
59 Burt v. Panjand, g U. S. i8o.
60 Burt v. Panjand, sujfra; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 229.
61 Toast's Case, ii Leigh (Va.) 74; State v. Davis, 8o N. Car. 412; Henry
v. State, 77 Ala. 75; Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind. i89; Sellen v. People, 4 Ill.
412; 1 Thompson on Trials, Sec. ii6.
82 Yanez v. State, 6 Tex. App. 429; Faville v. Shehan, 68 Iowa 241; Dan-
iels v. City Lowell, 139 Mass. 56; Rollins v. Ames, 2 N. H. 349 (S. C. 7Am.,
Dec. 79, and note) where the cases are collected on both sides of the question.
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edge, at the time of trial, of the incompetency of an accepted
juror is a waiver of objections, and knowledge of counsel binds
his client.63 (c) Challenges to the polls generally is a waiver of
challenge to the array; but an overruled challenge to the array,
with an exception taken thereon, is not waived by afterwards
challenging individual jurors. 4  (d) In an overruled challenge
for cause an exception thereon is waived if the juror is afterwards
challenged peremptorily, unless thereby the peremptory chal-
lenges are exhausted.6 5 (e) An exception to an erroneous over-
ruling of an objection or challenge is unavailing if the party does
not exhaust his peremptory challenges. 66 (f) When a party
waives a cause of challenge, existing only as against himself, the
,ther party cannot challenge upon the same ground. 67
In order to make the proper record for appeal, the grounds of
the challenge should be specifically stated; the request, refusal
and exception should appear, and, generally, the examination of
the juror in full. When the action of the court is placed on
record, and there is a regular issue and joinder, and judgment on
this issue, then error lies to this at common law. 68
C. La Rue Munson.
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63 State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280; Russell v. Quinn, 114 Mass. 103; Carmon
v3. Bullock, 26 Ga. 431; State v. Bowden, 71 Me. 89; Scott v. Moore, 4I Vt. 205.
6- Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434; Watkins v. Weaver, io Johns. (N.
Y.) 1o7; Mueller v. Rebham, 94 Ill. 142; Co. Litt I58 a.
65 Burt v. Panjand, 99 U. S. ISo; Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 823; People
v. Aplin, 86 Mich. 393; State v. Brady. 107 N. Car. 822; Wilson v. People, 94
Ill. 299; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518; Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio 221; Robinson
v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521; contra, Brown v. State, 70 Ind. 576; People v. Bodine,
x Denio (N. Y.) 281.
66Robinson v. Randell, sujhra; Sulings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408;
State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486; St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Lux, 63 Ill. 523; State V.
Jones, 97 N. Car. 469; White v. State, 3o Tex. app. 652.
67 State v. Ketchey, 70 N. Car. 621; Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142.
683 Wh. Crim. Law, Sec. 3152; R. v. Edmonds, 4 B. & Ald. 471.
